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Do Dened Contribution Pensions Correct for
Short-Sighted Savings Decisions? Evidence from the
UK
J. van de Veny
Abstract
Estimates for a structural model of savings and labour supply calculated on UK
eld data support the hypothesis of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The estimated model
indicates that a DC pension encourages increased saving and labour supply prior to
pension age, and substantially reduced labour supply thereafter. These results are
exaggerated when preferences are myopic. Welfare responses at the beginning of life to
the DC pension improve with the extent of myopia, and with the return to the pension
asset. Myopia represents an important factor in determining whether the DC pension
results in a positive welfare response at plausible parameter values.
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I. Introduction
Recent policy debate in the United Kingdom has emphasised the role of myopia in
justifying state involvement in retirement provisions (e.g. Pensions Commission, 2005, pp.
68-69, Department for Work and Pensions, 2006, p. 31). Very few studies have, however,
examined the empirical support for myopia on eld data, or the practical implications of
myopia for responses to pension alternatives. Without such work, it is not possible to say
how far myopia creates a need for publicly sponsored pensions, or whether a particular
pension scheme is well suited to the needs of myopic individuals. This study therefore
explores the empirical support for myopia on eld data for the UK. It then considers the
implications of myopia for behavioural and welfare responses to the National Employment
Savings Trust (NEST), a Dened Contribution (DC) pension scheme that will be introduced
in the UK from 2012.
The introduction of the NEST reects a contemporary trend toward greater reliance on
DC pension provision in the (third tier) private sector of the UK, and a similar trend among
OECD countries more generally.1 It is being introduced following recommendations made
by the Pensions Commission (2005), which found that administration costs made it unprof-
itable for existing private sector pension providers to serve employees on modest incomes.
The NEST is consequently designed to improve saving incentives by reducing management
charges, and by requiring all employers to o¤er a 3% matching pension contribution on
banded earnings to participating employees. It has been forecast that the scheme will serve
between 6 and 10 million people one out of every four people of working age and will
receive contributions worth £ 8 billion annually, 60% of which is projected to be new saving.
The success or failure of the scheme will have a profound inuence on the future of the UK
pensions system, and will have important implications for the wider group of countries that
face similar challenges due to population aging.
Although retirement behaviour has been studied at length in realistic policy contexts and
on the assumption of time consistent preferences, few studies have considered the associated
implications of myopia. Some aspects of this information gap are e¤ectively addressed by
the extensive literature that focuses upon policy design where the objective function of
the government is di¤erent from that of individuals (e.g. Kanbur et al. (2006)). But this
literature does not address the welfare advantage of commitment mechanisms in context of
time-inconsistent preferences, which has an important bearing on the responses of myopic
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agents to (illiquid) pension schemes.
A number of studies have focussed upon the implications of myopia for the distinction
between funded and Pay As You Go systems of social security, without focussing upon
responses to voluntary pension schemes in particular (e.g. Schwarz & Sheshinski (2007),
and Fehr & Kindermann (2009)). The only study of which I am aware that has explored
responses of myopic agents to voluntary DC pensions is by Laibson et al. (1998), who used
a structural model calibrated to the US economy to consider responses to IRA and 401(k)
plans. Laibson et al. nd that saving in the pension asset responds positively to agent
myopia, increasing by a factor of between 1.2 and 1.6 on their preferred model specication,
relative to time consistent preferences. Furthermore, they nd that myopia tends to improve
the welfare response to the introduction of a DC pension measured at the beginning of the
simulated life.
These results add support to the premise that myopia tends to justify the introduction
of a DC pension scheme. The intuition behind this proposition is well understood; sophis-
ticatedly myopic agents, who are aware of the time-inconsistency of their own preferences,
attach a welfare benet to commitment mechanisms that resolve their intra-personal conict
in favour of their present self. An individual, for example, may be happy to lock their money
away in an (illiquid) pension fund, if they believe that they will exhibit a propensity to
over-consume in the future.
However, the analysis reported by Laibson et al. is based upon a model of endogenous
saving in a liquid asset and a pension asset; it omits endogenous labour supply. This is
potentially important because labour supply and savings are likely to be jointly determined,
particularly close to retirement. The stylised analysis by Diamond & Köszegi (2003) which
omits a pension asset, but includes both saving and labour supply  also highlights the
potential for interesting intertemporal feed-back e¤ects between saving and labour supply in
context of time-inconsistent preferences.2 Furthermore, an important caveat that Laibson
et al. raise in relation to their results is the degree of sensitivity to their model calibration,
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particularly in relation to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
An alternative approach to model calibration is to specify the model using an economet-
ric criterion. Very few studies have, however, investigated the empirical evidence for myopia
beyond controlled laboratory experiments. The small number of studies that have estimated
models with myopic preferences on eld data focus upon margins of decision making that
are distinguished by the timing of their associated welfare e¤ects. Laibson et al. (2007), for
example, estimate a life-cycle model of consumption and investment decisions that distin-
guishes between (net) liquid assets on the one hand, and a composite illiquid asset that is
specied to reect housing and pensions on the other. Laibson et al. (2007) estimate their
model on US data for households with a high-school but not a college degree. They report
that restricting their model to constant exponential discounting results in an estimate for the
(per period) discount factor of 0.846 / 0.942 (depending on the weighting matrix applied).
Allowing for quasi-hyperbolic discounting results in an estimate for the short-run discount
factor of 0.674 / 0.687 and a long-run discount factor of 0.958 / 0.960. Almost all of the
specications that Laibson et al. consider reject the restriction that discount rates are equal
across all time horizons, and suggest that myopia is of practical importance.
In a similar vein, Fang & Silverman (2007) estimate a model of labour supply and
welfare programme participation for never-married mothers, again on US data. Like Laibson
et al. (2007), Fang & Silverman (2007) allow for present biassed preferences in the form
of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. They consider the hypothesis that people with myopic
preferences fail to account fully for the experience e¤ect on future wages of short-run labour
supply decisions (an illiquid investment in human capital), resulting in a bias toward welfare
dependency. The estimates that Fang and Silverman report reect in exaggerated form
those reported by Laibson et al.: the short-run discount factor at 0.296 / 0.308 (depending
on assumed preferences) is signicantly lower than the long-run discount factor at 0.875 /
0.868.
However, neither of these studies, nor others that have estimated time varying discount
3
rates on survey data (e.g. DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005, Paserman, 2008, and Shui and
Ausubel, 2004), take into account joint decisions over savings and labour supply. This paper
consequently extends the literature in two important dimensions: by reporting estimates
for myopic preferences in relation to joint decisions over liquid savings, pension savings, and
labour supply calculated on data for a broad segment of the UK population; and by exploring
the associated implications of myopia for DC pension schemes.
Section II. describes the model that was used to conduct the analysis. Section III.
reports parameter estimates for the model. The inuence of myopia on responses to the
introduction of a DC pension are analysed in Section IV.; readers who are interested only in
the policy relevant results may skip to Section IV. without excessive handicap. A summary
and directions for further research are provided in the conclusion.
II. The Structural Model
The unit of analysis is the household, dened as a single adult or partner couple and
their dependent children. Household decisions regarding consumption, labour supply, and
pension scheme contributions are considered at annual intervals throughout the life course,
which is assumed to run from age 20 to a maximum potential age of 120. Endogenous deci-
sions are based on the assumption that households maximise expected lifetime utility, given
their prevailing circumstances, preferences, and beliefs regarding the future. A households
circumstances are described by its age, number of adults, number of children, earnings,
net liquid worth, pension rights, and survival. The belief structure is rational in the sense
that expectations are consistent with the intertemporal decision making environment, and
the model is a partial equilibrium in that there are no feed-back e¤ects from the macro-
economy on wages or the returns to investment. The rationality of the belief structure also
extends to expectations over future preferences, so that myopic consumers are aware of the
time-inconsistency of their preferences. This section gives an abbreviated description of the
structural model; for a more detailed description, see van de Ven (2009).
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A. Preferences
Expected lifetime utility of household i at age t is described by the time separable
von-Neumann Morgenstern function:
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so that intratemporal utility u takes a Constant Elasticity of Substitution form, where  > 0
is the utility price of leisure, and " > 0 the (period specic) elasticity of substitution between
equivalised consumption (ci;t=i;t) and leisure (li;t). u is combined in the intertemporal
specication through an isoelastic transformation. Households choose over discretionary
composite consumption, ci;t 2 R+, and time spent in leisure, li;t 2 [0; 1]. Although the
consumption decision is taken over a continuous domain, labour status is chosen from a
set of discrete alternatives that represent full-time, part-time, and non-employment of adult
household members. A discrete specication is adopted for labour supply to reect the
substantial labour market rigidities that continue to exist, despite the increased exibility of
working time arrangements that has occurred since the 1970s.3
The discount factors  and  are assumed to be time invariant and the same for all
households. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting that reects a present bias in consumption applies
when  < 1. The analysis that is reported in Section IV. explores how alternative values of
 inuence responses to a DC pension scheme.
i;t 2 R+ is adult equivalent size based on the modiedOECD scale. It is included
in the preference relation to reect the empirical nding that household size is an important
determinant of the evolution of consumption during the life course. To x terms, the model
assumes that both members of a couple are of the same age, which denes the households
age, t. Et is the expectations operator at time t, tdeath is the age at death, which denes
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the time of death of all adult household members and is assumed to be uncertain. Dene
j t;t as the probability of surviving to age j given survival to age t, where T t;t = 0 for
all t. Then it is possible to replace tdeath by T , bring the expectations operator into the
summation sign, and include j t;t as an additional discount factor. j t;t is assumed to
be non-stochastic for all j, t. Although not explicitly included in the preference relation,
accidental bequests do occur due to the uncertainty assumed over the time of death. Where
a household dies with positive wealth balances, these are assumed to accrue to the state in
the form of a 100% inheritance tax.
B. The liquidity constraint
Dene wi;t as liquid net worth, which covers total non-pension wealth, including the
value of housing, cash balances, and other tradeable assets. Equation (1) is maximised,
subject to the age specic liquidity constraint, wi;t  Dt for all (i; t), where:
wi;t =
8><>: w^i;t t 6= tSPAw^i;t + pwpi;t t = tSPA(2a)
w^i;t =
8><>: div (wi;t 1   ci;t 1 +  i;t 1) n
a
t < n
a
t 1; t < tSPA
wi;t 1   ci;t 1 +  i;t 1 otherwise
(2b)
 i;t = (li;t; xi;t; n
a
i;t; n
c
i;t; ri;twi;t; pci;t; t)(2c)
wpi;t denotes wealth held in personal pensions. 
p is the proportion of pension wealth that is
taken as a tax free lump-sum at age tSPA. div is the proportion of net liquid worth that is
lost upon marital dissolution (to capture the impact of divorce).
 (:) is disposable income net of non-discretionary expenditure. Equation (2c) indicates
that taxes and benets are calculated with respect to labour supply, li;t; private non-property
income, xi;t; the numbers of adults, nai;t, and children, n
c
i;t; the return to liquid assets, ri;twi;t
(which is negative when wi;t < 0); private contributions to pensions, pci;t; and age, t.
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C. Disposable income
The lifetime is divided into two periods when calculating disposable income: the working
lifetime t < tSPA, and pension receipt tSPA  t; tSPA denotes state pension age. Throughout
the lifetime, household disposable income is calculated by rst evaluating aggregate take-
home pay from the taxable incomes of each adult member of a household  this reects
the taxation of individual incomes in the UK. Household benets (excluding adjustments
for childcare and housing costs) are then calculated, given aggregate household take-home
pay  this reects the provision of benets at the level of the family unit. Next, non-
discretionary net childcare costs (after adjusting for childcare related benets) are evaluated,
given aggregate household take-home pay. This is of separate importance because childcare
costs inuence labour supply decisions. Non-discretionary net housing costs (after adjusting
for relevant benets) are then calculated on aggregate take-home pay plus benets less
childcare costs this reects the means testing of housing related benets in the UK, which
is administered with respect to income net of most other elements of the tax and benets
system. Finally, disposable income is equal to aggregate take-home pay, plus benets, less
net childcare costs, less net housing costs.
Calculation of taxable income for each adult in a household depends on the households
age, with property and non-property income treated separately. For all t < tSPA, household
non-property income xi;t is equal to labour income gi;t less pension contributions. For t 
tSPA, xi;t is equal to labour income plus pension annuity income:
xi;t =
8><>: gi;t   pci;tgi;t + ppi;t + spt
t < tSPA
t  tSPA
(3)
where : ppi;t =
8><>:  (1  
p)wpi;t t = tSPA
s+(1 s):(nai;t 1)
s+(1 s):(nai;t 1 1)

ppi;t 1 t > tSPA
(4)
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ppi;t denotes private pension annuity, spt denotes state pension income, and  is the annuity
rate. This specication reects the EET form of taxation applied to pension savings in the
UK, which is in common with most other OECD countries.4 The annuity purchased at age
tSPA is ination linked, and reduces to a fraction s of its (real) value in the preceding year
if one member of a couple dies.5
Where the household is identied as supplying labour, and is younger than state pension
age, then non-property (employment) income is split between spouses (in the case of married
couples) on the basis of their respective labour supplies. A household without an employed
adult has all of its non-property (pension) income allocated to a single spouse. Similarly,
property income is only allocated between spouses for households below state pension age,
and who supply some labour. In this case, property income is allocated evenly between
working couples. Property income, yi;t, is equal to the return from positive balances of
liquid net worth:
(5) yi;t =
8><>: ri;twi;t if wi;t > 00 otherwise
Hence, the model assumes that the interest cost on loans (when wi;t < 0) cannot be written
o¤ against labour income for tax purposes.
The interest rate on liquid net worth is deterministic, and depends upon whether wi;t
indicates net investment assets or net debts:
ri;t =
8><>:
rI if wi;t > 0
rDl +
 
rDu   rDl

min

 wi;t
max[gi;t;0:7g(hi;t;lfti;t)]
; 1

; rDl < r
D
u if wi;t  0
where lfti;t is household leisure when one adult in household i at age t is full-time employed.
This specication for the interest rate implies that the interest charge on debt increases from
a minimum of rDl when the debt to income ratio is low, up to a maximum rate of r
D
u , when
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the ratio is high. The specication also implies that households that are in debt are treated
less punitively if they have at least one adult earning a full-time wage.
D. Pension saving
As is implicit in the above discussion, pensions are modelled at the household level, and
are dened contribution in the sense that every household is assigned an account into which
their respective pension contributions are (notionally) deposited. Pension wealth accrues
a (post-tax) rate of return, rp, which is certain. Prior to age tSPA, all households with
labour income in excess of a lower limit in the prevailing year, gi;t > pl, choose whether,
and what fraction of their labour income, pci;t, to contribute to their pension, subject to the
lower bound pc0 . Households that choose to participate in the pension during a given year
also receive a matching employer contribution, equal to a xed fraction of their employment
income, pec. All pension contributions are tax exempt (as discussed above). The balance of
household is pension account at any age, t < tSPA, is given by:
wpi;t =
8><>: divw^
p
i;t n
a
t < n
a
t 1
w^pi;t otherwise
w^pi;t =
8><>: (1 + r
p)wpi;t 1 +
 
pci;t 1 + 
p
ec

gi;t 1
(1 + rp)wpi;t 1
if pci;t 1 > pc0 ; gi;t 1 > pl
otherwise
(6)
where gi;t denotes aggregate household labour income in period t, and all other variables are
as dened previously.
E. Labour income dynamics
Three household characteristics inuence labour income: the households labour supply
decision li;t, the latent wage hi;t, and whether a wage o¤er woi;t is received.6 A wage o¤er is
received at any age t with a relationship specic (exogenous) probability, pwo
 
nai;t

, which is
included to capture the incidence of (involuntary) unemployment. If a household receives a
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wage o¤er, then its labour income for the respective year is equal to a fraction of its latent
wage, with the fraction dened as an increasing function of its labour supply; gi;t =  (li;t)hi;t.
A household that receives a wage o¤er and chooses to supply the maximum amount of labour
receives its full latent wage, in which case gi;t = hi;t. A household that does not receive a
wage o¤er is assumed to receive gi;t = 0 regardless of its labour supply (implying no labour
supply where employment incurs a leisure penalty).
Latent wages evolve as a random walk with drift:
ln (hi;t+1)  ln (hi;t) = fh
 
nai;t; t

+ 
 
nai;t; li;t

+ !i;t(7a)
!i;t  N

0; 2!;nai;t

(7b)
where  (:) is an experience e¤ect, and !i;t is a household specic disturbance term.
Most of the associated literature omits an experience e¤ect from the wage process as this
complicates solution of the utility maximisation problem by invalidating two-stage budgeting.
Related studies have, however, found it di¢ cult to match the high rates of labour market
participation that are reported in survey data among the young relative to the old in context
of the strong wage growth that is typically observed with age. French (2005) suggests that
this consideration was behind the high estimated values that he reports for the discount
factor. Career building appears to be a plausible explanation for the high rates of employment
participation that are observed among young people, and an experience e¤ect is included to
capture this; see Sefton et al. (2008) and Sefton & van de Ven (2009).
F. Household demographics
Household relationship status is modelled explicitly, and is uncertain from one year to
the next. The probabilities of relationship transitions including the formation of cohabi-
tating unions and their dissolution through death, divorce, and annulment are described
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by the reduced form logit equation:
(8) si;t+1 = fs(t) + Asi;t
where si;t is a dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if household i is comprised of a
single adult at age t and zero otherwise. The number of children in a household evolves
in a deterministic fashion, based upon a households age and relationship status, so that:
nci;t = n
c
 
nai;t; t

.
G. Model solution
The allowance for uncertainty in the model implies that an analytical solution to the
utility maximisation problem does not exist, and numerical solution routines need to be
employed. Starting in the last possible period of a households life, T , uncertainty plays no
further role and the optimisation problem is simple to solve for given numbers of adults nat ,
liquid net worth wT , and annuity income pT , omitting the household index i for brevity. We
denote the maximum achievable utility in period T , the value function, by VT (naT ; wT ; pT ):
VT (n
a
T ; wT ; pT ) = u
bcT (naT ; wT ; pT )
T
; 1

(9)
WT (n
a
T ; wT ; pT ) = VT (n
a
T ; wT ; pT )(10)
where bcT denotes the optimised measure of consumption, and leisure l^T = 1 by assumption.
VT is solved at each node of the three dimensional grid over the permissable state space
(naT ; wT ; pT ). WT is an intermediate term that is stored to evaluate utility maximising solu-
tions in period T   1; it is necessarily equal to VT (as indicated above) in the nal period,
but may di¤er from VT in earlier periods as is described below.
At time T   1, the problem reduces to solving the Bellman equation:
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subject to the intertemporal dynamics that are described above. Note that, WT 1 6= VT 1,
if  6= 1, which indicates the inuence of time inconsistency in the context of myopic prefer-
ences. This optimisation problem is solved for the T 1 value function VT 1 and intermediate
termWT 1 at each node of the three dimensional grid over the permissable state-space. Solu-
tions for ages less than T  1 then proceed via backward induction, based upon the solutions
obtained for later ages.7 Where labour supply is permitted, the optimisation includes the
alternative labour decisions, and the state space expands to include latent wages ht and wage
o¤ers wot. For ages under tSPA, solutions are also required for pension contributions, and
pension wealth replaces annuity income in the state space. A more complete description
of the analytical problem, including the treatment of boundary conditions, is reported in
van de Ven (2009).
Solutions to the optimisation problem are identied by searching over the value func-
tion, using Powells method in multiple dimensions and Brents method in a single dimension
(see Press et al. (1986)). The expectations operator is evaluated in context of the log-normal
distribution assumed for wages using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature, which permits evalua-
tion at a set of discrete abscissae (ve abscissae are used). Linear interpolation methods are
used to evaluate the value function at points between the assumed grid nodes throughout
the simulated lifetime.
Although the search routines that are used are e¢ cient when the objective function
is reasonably well behaved, they are not designed to distinguish between local and global
optima. A supplementary search routine is consequently used, which tests over a localised
grid above and below an identied optimum for a preferred decision set. If a preferred
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decision set is identied, then the supplementary routine searches recursively for any further
solutions. This process is repeated until no further solutions are found, and the one that
maximises the value function is selected.
Having solved for utility maximising behavioural responses at grid nodes as described
above, the life-courses of individual households are simulated by running households forward
through the grids. This is done by rst populating a simulated sample by taking random
draws from a joint distribution of all potential state variables at the youngest age considered
for analysis. The behaviour of each simulated household, i, at the youngest age is then
identied by interpolating over the decisions stored about their respective grid co-ordinates.
Given household is characteristics (state variables) and behaviour, its characteristics are
aged one year following the processes that govern their intertemporal variation. Where these
processes depend upon stochastic terms, new random draws are taken from their respective
distributions (commonly referred to as Monte Carlo simulation). This process is repeated
for the entire simulated life of each household. The data generated for the simulated cohort
are then used as the basis for estimation and analysis.
III. Parameter Estimates
A. Estimation method
The parameters of the model described in Section II. were estimated by the Method
of Simulated Moments (MSMs), which is now fairly standard in comparable analytical con-
texts.8 The approach estimates the model in two discrete stages. In the rst stage, para-
meters that are exogenously observable are estimated without reference to the structural
model. Estimates for unobserved parameters are then estimated endogenously to the model
in a second stage, taking the parameter estimates calculated in the rst stage as given.
The endogenous estimation of the second stage is conducted by matching the population
moments for a selected set of characteristics that are implied by the structural model (simu-
lated moments) to associated moments estimated from survey data (sample moments). This
13
matching is undertaken by minimising a weighted loss function of the di¤erence between the
simulated and sample moments, where the weighting matrix is optimally designed to capture
uncertainty over the model parameters estimated in the rst stage.
B. Data
The model parameters were estimated on data for individuals aged 25 to 45 in 2007/08,
on the assumptions that observed households behaved as though they would be subject to
the 2007 policy environment for the remainder of their lives; that they expected labour
incomes to increase at a constant rate based on the observed growth between 1990 and 2007;
that expectations regarding cohabitation reected transitions observed between 1991 and
2007; and that expected mortality rates reected o¢ cial projections for the cohort aged 35
in 2007. Furthermore, the micro-data upon which the estimation is based were screened to
omit public sector employees who are eligible to non-contributory pensions9, and the self-
employed whose circumstances upon reaching retirement often depend crucially upon the
sale of their respective businesses. The omitted population subgroups accounted for just
under 20 percent of the total work force in the UK in 2007/08.10
These assumptions represent a balance between the prevailing computational limita-
tions, and the objective to obtain a faithful reection of the household decision making
context. The principal simplication of the estimation is that it limits variation of the
policy environment. The importance of this consideration is exaggerated by the focus on
endogenous labour supply, which requires the model to take explicit account of tax and ben-
ets policy. The alternative aspects of the estimation are designed to militate against the
distortions that are consequent upon this simplication. Financial statistics were adjusted
to reect real wage growth to capture expectations that individuals may reasonably have
had over how their circumstances were likely to evolve with age. The dynamic model of
cohabitation was estimated on data for a time period that forms a reasonable basis for the
specication of agent specic expectations. Mortality rates reect o¢ cial projections for
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improvements in longevity. And the generational age band considered for estimation con-
trols for the heterogeneous circumstances of di¤erent birth cohorts. This last consideration
is particularly relevant in the current context, as recent reforms to the UK pensions system
substantially alter the circumstances of workers distinguished by year of birth. The age band
was selected to focus upon the period in life when the illiquidity of pension wealth is likely to
have the most pronounced inuence on behaviour in context of time inconsistent preferences.
Individual data sources are reported alongside the parameter estimates throughout the
discussion that follows.
C. First stage parameter estimates
The structural model is based upon a total of 395 parameters. 3 of these describe interest
rates on liquid net worth; 13 parameters describe the evolution of household demographics
(relationship status and dependant children); 101 parameters describe age specic probabil-
ities of mortality; 50 parameters describe the earnings processes for singles and couples; 210
parameters describe the tax and benets system; 13 parameters describe the nature of per-
sonal pensions; and 5 parameters describe household preferences. All but the ve preference
parameters were estimated exogenous of the structural model.
The 390 parameters estimated in the rst stage are reported in Tables 7 to 10 of Ap-
pendix A.
Credit constraints, real interest rates, and growth rates. Households cannot
borrow in excess of £ 2,000 at any age, subject to the condition that all debts be repaid by
age 65, as reported in Table 7. Real interest and growth rates are reported in the top panel
of Table 8. The lower limit cost of debt
 
rDl

was set to 11.5 percent per annum, and the
upper limit
 
rDu

to 19.8 percent, which reects the range of average real interest charges
applied between January 1996 and January 2008 to credit card loans and overdrafts in the
UK. Positive balances of liquid net worth were assumed to earn a return
 
rI

of 2.7 percent
per annum, equal to the average real return on xed rate bond deposits held with banks and
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building societies during the period between January 1996 and January 2008. The return to
pension wealth (rpt = r
p) was set equal to 4.1 percent per annum based on the average return
to capital described in the UK National Accounts between 1988 and 2006, as reported by
Khoman & Weale (2008). The real rate of wage growth, used to adjust moments of nancial
characteristics in the second stage of the model estimation, was set to 1.3 percent per annum,
equal to the real growth observed for the average earnings index between 1990 and 2007.
Welfare benets were assumed to fall very marginally with time (annual rate of 0.1%), to
reect historical data over the period 1978 to 2008 on the value of unemployment benets
and the basic state pension. Similarly, real tax thresholds were assumed to rise by 0.3 percent
per annum, based on growth of the income threshold for the highest rate of income tax over
the period 1997 to 2007.
Household demographics. It was assumed that a household can be comprised of one
or two adults to age 99, and of a single adult from age 100. The logit function that governs
relationship transitions in the model was selected after considering various alternatives, and
is described by equation (13). This equation was estimated on pooled data from waves 1
(1991) to 17 (2007) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), which were reorganised
by family unit, and screened to omit any unit by year that had missing data, or that had
adult members who were either self employed or employees in public sector organisations with
access to non-contributory occupational pensions.11 Throughout the analysis, household age
for adult couples reported in survey data was set equal to the age of the eldest spouse.
Parameter estimates are reported on the left hand side of the middle panel of Table 8.
The numbers of children by age and relationship status were described by equation (14)
(the density function of the normal distribution), which provides a close reection of the
average numbers of children by parental age described by survey data. Equation (14) was
estimated separately for singles and couples on data from the 2007/08 Family Resources
Survey (FRS). As for the BHPS data referred to above, the FRS data were organised at the
level of the family (benet) unit, and screened to omit observations with inconsistent data.
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Estimates for equation (14) are reported on the right hand side of the middle panel of Table
8.
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Mortality probabilities by age. The survival probabilities assumed for estimating
the model are based upon the cohort expectations of life published by the O¢ ce for National
Statistics (ONS). These data were used to calculate the age specic probabilities of survival
for a same-aged couple, where both members of the couple were aged 35 in 2007 (the middle
of the target age band for estimation). The life expectancies are based on historical survival
rates from 1981 to 2006, and calendar year survival rates from the 2006-based principal
projections.
The o¢ cial data permit survival rates to be calculated to age 94, whereas a maximum
age of 120 was assumed in the model. Age specic survival probabilities between 95 and
120 were exogenously adjusted to describe a smooth sigmoidal progression from the o¢ cial
estimate at age 94 to a 0 percent survival probability at age 120. The mortality rates used
are reported at the bottom of Table 8.
The probability of a low wage o¤er. Previous experience in use of the structural
model revealed that wages tend to be su¢ cient to motivate some labour supply by almost
all households during the prime working years spanning ages 25 to 45. The probability of
a low wage o¤er (see Section E.) was consequently set to the proportion of single adults
and couples that were identied as not working within this age band, as described by data
reported by the 2007/08 wave of the FRS (described in Section C..2). The associated sample
statistics are reported in the top panel of Table 9.
Distinguishing the implications of alternative labour supply decisions. Single
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adults were considered to choose between full-time employment, part-time employment, and
not employed. Couples choose between 2 full-time employed, 1 full-time and 1 part-time em-
ployed, 1 full-time employed and 1 not employed, 1 part-time employed and 1 not employed,
and 2 not employed; the option to allow for 2 part-time employed adults in a household
was omitted because very few households take up this option in practice. The inuence of
alternative labour supply decisions on leisure and income from employment were dened
as non-stochastic and age invariant proportions of the respective statistics associated with
the maximum employment decision (full-time employment of all adult household members).
These proportions were estimated using data for households aged between 20 and 59 from
the 2007/08 FRS, organised and screened as described in Section C..2. Weighted averages
were calculated for the number of hours worked and log wages, distinguishing population
sub-samples by the number of adults in a household and labour market status.12 These
statistics are reported toward the top of Table 9.
The distribution of wages at age 20. Each simulated household that is generated
by the model (discussed in Section G.) was allocated a latent wage at age 20 by taking a
random draw from a log normal distribution. The mean and variance of the distribution
for singles and couples of log latent wages at age 20 were estimated on the same FRS data
that were used to estimate the implications of alternative labour supply decisions (described
above). A sample selection model that describes log wages as a cubic function of age was
estimated separately for singles and couples.13 These estimates were used to calculate the
means for singles and couples of log full-time wages at age 20 that were assumed in the
second stage estimation. The standard deviations of the log-normal distributions were set
equal to the FRS sample statistics observed for the respective population subgroups at age
20. These statistics are reported in the middle panel of Table 9.
Labour income dynamics. An experience e¤ect was only taken into consideration
where relationship status remained unchanged between adjacent periods. To estimate an
experience e¤ect over the extensive labour margin, recursive substitution was used to restate
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equation (7a) as:
ln (gi;t+2)  ln (gi;t) = ln ( (empi;t+2))  ln ( (empi;t)) + ::
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
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where n is the number of potential labour states, empji;t is a dummy variable that is equal to 1
if household i engages in employment state j at age t and zero otherwise, and j denotes the
respective experience e¤ect; all other variables are as dened previously.14 Where relationship
status was observed to change between adjacent periods, omission of an experience e¤ect
enabled equation (7a) to be estimated directly.
The time dimension that is embedded in the specication of the equations that govern
intertemporal wage dynamics made the FRS an unsuitable data source for estimation. Data
from waves 1 to 17 of the BHPS for households aged between 20 and 64 were consequently
used for estimation, organised and screened as described in Section C..2. The sample for
estimation was extended beyond the 25 to 45 year old age band to limit the inuence of
boundary e¤ects in relation to estimated polynomials by age, and to provide a plausible
description for agent expectations regarding later ages.
The pooled BHPS data were divided into four population sub-groups distinguished by
the marital transitions observed in adjacent years. Each sub-sample was then censored
to omit extreme observations on the respective dependent variable (ln (gi;t+2)   ln (gi;t) or
ln (gi;t+1)  ln (gi;t)), resulting in sample sizes for estimation of 18,631 for continuously single
adults, 27,831 for continuously married families, 3,850 newly married families, and 3,705
newly single families. Separate estimates were calculated on the data for each of these
population subgroups, correcting for sample selection and heteroscedasticity of error terms.15
The results of unrestricted estimations are reported for newly married and newly single
households in Table 9. In the case of continuously single / married households, unrestricted
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estimates indicate that the e¤ects of experience on prospective wages were estimated with
relatively high standard errors. These were amended to the extent permitted by the data,
to ensure that experience was a monotonically increasing function of employment. The
regression parameters obtained after restricting the e¤ects of experience are reported in
Table 10.
Taxes and benets. As discussed in Section 2.3, the wedge between gross private
income and disposable income was calculated by dividing the life course into two periods.
Taxes and benets during the working lifetime, t < tSPA, were structured to reect the
schedules by household demographic category that are reported in the April 2007 edition of
the Tax Benet Model Tables (TBMT), issued by the Department for Work and Pensions
(see http://www.dwp.gov.uk/asd/tbmt.asp). During the period of pension receipt, tSPA  t,
the model was designed to reect income taxes in 2007, and was loosely dened around the
system of retirement benets set out in the 2006 Pensions White Paper (DWP, 2006b). This
last assumption was made because the White Paper was both freely available and widely
publicised during the period covered by the estimation, and is a sensible data source for the
specication of agent expectations. In line with the pensionsWhite Paper, the model assumes
a state pension age of 68. At this age, all individuals were assumed to be eligible to a full
at-rate state pension, which reects the expanded coverage of state pensions implemented
by the reforms described in the 2006 White Paper, and the coincident amendments to make
state pensions a at-rate benet worth around £ 135 per week to a single pensioner in 2006
earnings terms. Means-tested benets subject to a 100% clawback rate were assumed to
keep pace with the increased generosity of the at-rate state pension, so that they could be
ignored. The (real) value of means tested benets subject to a 40% clawback rate are set
out by the 2006 White Paper to grow with wages between 2008 and 2015, and to be frozen
in real terms thereafter. The model assumed a 10% discount to the value of these state
retirement benets, to reect on-going concerns over their sustainability.16
Private pensions. There is a great deal of diversity in private pension arrangements
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in the UK, and in the details of occupational pensions in particular. This aspect of the model
specication was further complicated by a lack of data at the household level regarding the
magnitude of pension contributions, and the contributions of employers in particular. The
endogenous pension decision was consequently restricted for the estimation to focus upon
the issue of pension participation. Any household with a wage in excess of pl = $317 per
week 75% of the median household wage in 2007 was considered eligible to participate
in the pension during the given year. The pension contribution rate for employees who
choose to participate in a private pension was set to pc = 8% of employee earnings, which
is the normalcontribution rate stated in the guidance to interviewers for the FRS. The
rate of matching employer contributions (paid into pensions of participating employees) was
set to pec = 11% of employee earnings, which is the average contribution rate to employer
sponsored pensions that is reported in Forth & Stokes (2008).
The annuity rate, , was specied as actuarially fair, given the assumed mortality rates,
the return on pension wealth, and subject to a one-time capital charge of 4.7 percent to reect
administration expenses and uncertainty over mortality rate projections.17 The proportion
of pension wealth used to purchase an annuity at state pension age was set to 75%, based
on the maximum pension wealth that could be taken as a tax free lump-sum at retirement
in 2006.
D. Second stage preference parameter estimates
Moments for the second stage estimation. The statistical analysis that is re-
ported here is structured around the observation that, relative to time-consistent agents,
sophisticatedly myopic consumers will perceive as valuable commitment mechanisms that
resolve conict between the preferences of di¤erent intertemporal selves in favour of the
present self. The unobserved preference parameters of the model were consequently esti-
mated by minimising the disparity  as measured by a weighted loss function between
simulated and sample moments over four sets of population characteristics. A set of age and
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relationship specic rates of pension scheme membership were included on the hypothesis
that these might be important in identifying the short-run discount factor, in common with
Laibson et al. (2007). Age and relationship specic means of log household consumption are
important in determining discount factors and the isoelastic parameter , given the rst-
stage estimates for rates of investment return. Moments of employment status by age and
relationship status relate closely to the utility price of leisure, and may also bear upon the
short-run discount factor due to the commitment mechanism o¤ered by wages that respond
to an experience e¤ect, in common with Fang & Silverman (2007). And rates of employ-
ment participation by wealth quintile observed late in the working lifetime were considered
to improve identication over the intratemporal elasticity ", following Sefton et al. (2008).
All but the last set of moments conditions describe circumstances over the target age band
25 to 45, with the last focussing on the age band 50 to 59 to capture retirement behaviour.
The moments considered for estimating the model preference parameters are reported
in Table 11 of Appendix B.
Parameter estimates. Table 1 reports regression statistics over the full set of pref-
erence parameters. Starting with the results reported for the model specication based on
the assumption of exponential discounting, the point estimate of the discount factor implies
a discount rate of 3.2 percent per annum, which is insignicantly di¤erent from the estimated
rate of return to positive balances of liquid net worth described in Section C.. The relative
values of the point estimates obtained for the isoelastic parameter  and the intratemporal
elasticity " imply that leisure and consumption are direct complements in utility.18 But the
large standard errors obtained for these parameter estimates imply that this relationship
between consumption and leisure is not statistically signicant. The estimated parameters
also imply an intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption of 0.13 measured at
the population means. This lies within the (admittedly wide) range of values that have been
reported in the associated empirical literature.
Relaxing the specication to allow for quasi-hyperbolic discounting obtains an estimate
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for the excess short-run discount factor of 0.846, which is signicantly less than one. The
fall in the short-run discount factor is partly o¤-set by a coincident rise in the estimate
obtained for the long-run discount factor from 0.969 to 0.976. Hence the regression results
provide empirical support for the proposition that the discount rate associated with the rst
prospective year at 21 percent exceeds the long-run discount rate at 2.5 percent per
annum. Comparing the target moments that are reported in the bottom half of the panel
reveals that allowing for quasi-hyperbolic discounting improves the match obtained between
the model and sample moments over pension participation and labour supply; the match to
moments for consumption, by contrast, deteriorate very slightly. These results are consistent
with the set of hypotheses upon which the empirical study is based; that an allowance for
sophisticated myopia might help to better explain observed behaviour over margins that
have the potential to serve as commitment mechanisms, non-durable consumption obviously
not being one of these.
The current results reect less pronounced myopia than is implied by the estimated
discount rates reported in the small number of studies that exist. Laibson et al. (2007), for
example report estimates for the short-run discount factor of 0.674 / 0.687 compared with
0.958 / 0.960 for the long-run discount factor, and Fang & Silverman (2007) report 0.296 /
0.308 compared with 0.875 / 0.868. This disparity with the results that are reported here
is attributable to the broader subgroup of the population that is considered for estimation,
relative to Laibson et al. and Fang and Silverman.
The analyses reported in Section IV. are principally based upon the parameter estimates
reported in Table 1. To facilitate sensitivity analysis of the results obtained to the degree
of myopia,  was re-estimated for a given set of parameter values (; "; ; ). Starting
from the estimates set out in Table 1, the isoelastic parameter  was restricted to 1.4,
the intratemporal elasticity " to 0.55, and the utility price of leisure to 1.3983.19 Seven
alternative values for the short-run excess discount factor  are considered, centered over
0.85, and spaced evenly over the domain [0:70; 1:00].  was re-estimated for each of these
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alternative values of  to focus the analysis upon the inuence of myopia, by (imperfectly)
controlling for impatience. The estimates obtained for , given the parameter restrictions
set out above, are reported in Table 2.
Measures reported for the loss function in Table 2 indicate that the best overall t to the
sample moments was obtained for  = 0:85, consistent with the results reported in Table 1.
As anticipated, estimates for  monotonically rise as the assumed value for  falls, o¤setting
the impact that a fall in  has on impatience over all prospective time horizons. The term
to equivalence that is reported in the bottom row of Table 2 provides a measure of the
extent to which the rise in the estimated  o¤-sets the associated fall in . Dene 0 as
the exponential discount factor associated with  = 1, and 1 as the exponential discount
factor with  = 1. Then the term to equivalence is the time horizon at which the discount
factors under each form of discounting are equivalent, t^ = ln (1) = [ln (0)  ln (1)]. For
time periods less than the term-to-equivalence, quasi-hyperbolic discounting applies a lower
discount factor (higher annualised discount rate), relative to exponential discounting, and
vice versa for periods in excess of the term-to-equivalence. The statistics that are reported
at the bottom of Table 2 all imply a term-to-equivalence of around 20 years, indicating
that lower values of  imply greater disparity between short-run and long-run discount rates
and therefore more pronounced time-inconsistency of preferences while maintaining the
period over which the myopic specications imply greater impatience, relative to exponential
discounting.
IV. The E¤ects of Introducing a Dened Contribution (DC) Pension Scheme
A. Policy counterfactuals
The analysis is based upon repeated simulations for a cohort of 10,000 households,
where each simulation assumes that households (accurately) expect that they will be subject
to a single policy environment throughout the course of their lives. Long-run behavioural
responses to policy are identied by comparing household decisions made under one policy
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Table 1: Structural estimation of full set of preference parameters
exponential quasi-hyperbolic
parameter estimate std error estimate std error
short-run excess discount factor 1.0000 . 0.8458 0.0401
long-run (exponential) discount factor 0.9693 0.0053 0.9760 0.0041
intertemporal isoelastic parameter 1.4380 0.5212 1.3760 0.2964
intra-temporal elasticity 0.5485 0.0909 0.5500 0.0453
utility price of leisure 1.4003 0.0940 1.3900 0.0336
target moments
consumption 1.270E-02 1.305E-02
pension participation 8.308E-03 7.762E-03
part-time employment 3.675E-03 3.471E-03
full-time employment 7.313E-03 6.678E-03
non-emp of 1st to 5th wealth quintiles 4.407E-02 1.583E-02
Loss function 5.5339 5.0291
J statistic 866.37 775.86
Test of over-identifying restrictions* 0.0000 0.0000
Notes: * p-values
Table 2: Structural estimates of the exponential discount factor, for restricted values of the
excess short-run discount factor
parameter
long-run (exponential) discount factor 0.9690 0.9717 0.9737 0.9767 0.9782 0.9818 0.9824
(0.0044) (0.0058) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0022)
restricted preference parameters
short-run excess discount factor 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70
intertemporal isoelastic parameter 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40
intra-temporal elasticity 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
utility price of leisure 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983 1.3983
Loss function 5.6246 5.4859 5.4844 5.3038 5.6171 6.8948 7.3733
J statistic 882.47 851.60 839.30 806.98 868.76 1049.01 1157.77
Term to equivalence* . 18.10 21.65 20.34 23.56 21.81 25.92
Notes: standard errors reported in parentheses
* defines the time horizon at which the implied discount factor is equivalent to the exponential discount factor (the left-most column)
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environment with those made under another, where the only variable between compared
simulations is the considered policy environment.20 A small open economy is assumed, so
that there are no feed-back e¤ects of aggregate savings and labour supply on interest rates
or wages.
The analysis was conducted by comparing behaviour and welfare under two principal
policy environments, which are distinguished from one another by the existence of a DC
pension scheme structured around the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST). This
central policy counterfactual is consistent with the motivation underlying the introduction
of the NEST, which is to extend pension eligibility to people who are not currently served
by the existing system of private pensions in the UK. The terms of the DC pension that
is considered here are also specied to reect the broad strokes of the NEST. Where the
DC pension exists, then all employees under age 68 are eligible to choose to participate in
the scheme. If they do choose to participate, then they must also specify the proportion of
their gross labour income to contribute to the scheme during the given year, subject to a
lower bound of 5%. Any employee who chooses to participate in the DC pension receives a
matching employer contribution worth 3% of gross earnings, and all contributions are exempt
from income tax. At age 68, 25% of each individuals pension fund is returned as a tax free
lump sum, with the remainder used to purchase a life annuity, paying an actuarially fair
dividend subject to a capital charge of 4.7% (as set out in Sections D. and C.).
The terms of the DC pension that are set out above di¤er from the NEST in four
respects. First, the assumption that the pension fund is illiquid until age 68 contrasts with
the minimum pensionable age of 55 that is currently imposed in the UK. The pension age
assumed for the DC pension was aligned with state pension age in the absence of a clear view
about how the minimum pensionable age is likely to evolve during the next few decades. The
uncertainty is highlighted by policy changes implemented in 2006 that required all pension
schemes in the UK to raise their minimum age of retirement from 50 to 55 by 2010. The
inuence that this assumption has on the analysis will depend upon how it a¤ects the value
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of the DC pension as a commitment mechanism to myopic agents.
Second, auto-enrolment is an aspect of the design of the NEST that is omitted from the
current analysis. There is extensive empirical evidence to suggest that auto-enrolment has an
important bearing on rates of pension scheme participation. In the current context, however
where decisions are the product of maximising behaviour subject to rational expectations
and in the absence of decision making costs auto-enrolment has no role to play. I return
to this issue in the concluding remarks.
Third, to limit competition between the NEST and the existing market of private pension
providers in the UK, NEST accounts will be subject to a series of constraints on the band of
income from which contributions can be made, the aggregate value that can be contributed
in any one year, and the transfers that can be made into the scheme from alternative pension
plans. These issues are omitted from the analysis because they are orthogonal to our subject
of interest.
Finally, the NEST is designed to provide low cost access to professional funds man-
agement, and will allow a degree of exibility over the assets into which contributions can
be invested. The current analysis abstracts from the detailed asset allocation problem, by
focussing only upon xed rates of investment return. To the extent that investment exi-
bility is an important factor determining savings held in pensions, the model will tend to
understate contribution rates, and ultimately rates of participation.
Introducing the DC pension scheme described above acts to raise the e¤ective return
to labour supply, directly through the employer contribution, and indirectly through the
preferential tax treatment of pension contributions. Adjustments to o¤-set the pecuniary
impact of the DC pension scheme consequently have an important bearing upon the results
obtained. These adjustments were administered through the government budget constraint
on the assumption that the matching (employer) pension contributions were paid for by the
government. Two forms of tax adjustment to maintain neutrality of the aggregate govern-
ment budget were explored: a xed proportional tax on all labour income; and adjustment
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of the upper two rates of income tax of the four rate schedule that was applied in the UK
in 2007. The second of these two alternatives leaves lower rate tax payers una¤ected, and
was selected to o¤-set the regressivity that is otherwise consequent on the introduction of a
DC pension (returned to below). As similar results were obtained under both methods of
tax adjustment, results assuming the xed proportional tax on labour income are reported
in the following subsections, and those obtained under the alternative tax adjustment can
be obtained from the author upon request.
I begin by discussing e¤ects of the DC pension simulated under the preference parame-
ters reported in Table 1. Section B. reports responses on the assumption of exponential dis-
counting, and Section C. explores the e¤ects of myopia on the assumption of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. Sensitivity of the analysis to the extent of myopia is then explored with reference
to the preference parameters that are reported in Table 2.
B. Behavioural responses in context of time-consistent preferences
Table 3 reports the long-run behavioural and welfare e¤ects of introducing the DC pen-
sion set out in Section A., given the model parameters reported for exponential discounting
in Table 1, and on the assumption that the pension fund earns the same real rate of return
as positive balances on liquid net worth (2.7 percent per annum). I report the e¤ects of
the DC pension in per-capita terms because the NEST is explicitly designed to address the
needs of individual employees in the UK, rather than an economy-wide reform.
Table 3 divides the population into quintile groups based upon average disposable house-
hold income earned between ages 20 and 67, so that each quintile follows the same group
of households through their respective lives. Working down from the top of Table 3, the re-
ported statistics indicate that the tax advantages of the pension asset and the 3% matching
employer pension contribution are su¢ cient incentives to generate widespread participation
in the pension scheme. It is of little surprise that the highest rates of pension scheme partic-
ipation toward the end of the working life are observed amongst households at the top of the
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Table 3: Long-run e¤ects of introducing a dened contribution pension where a pension asset
did not previously exist and preferences are time consistent
age group
lowest
income
quintile
2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile
highest
income
quintile
average
proportion of decile contributing to private pension (%*)
20 to 34 31 21 13 10 14 18
35 to 49 62 52 45 54 74 57
50 to 67 37 40 62 80 86 61
change in employment (%*)
45 to 54 -0.4 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.3
55 to 64 -0.6 1.1 1.5 0.4 -0.7 0.3
65 to 74 -5.0 -2.2 -3.7 -14.8 -29.8 -11.1
average pension wealth (%**)
20 to 34 6 5 3 3 5 4
35 to 49 82 86 79 100 162 102
50 to 67 192 225 291 513 957 436
change in total net worth (%**)
20 to 34 5 3 1 0 2 2
35 to 49 81 82 72 90 157 96
50 to 67 189 210 242 404 707 350
compensating variation of pension introduction (%**)
20 10 15 16 17 16 15
68 -43 -61 -98 -182 -383 -154
Responses to a DC pension paying a real return to invested funds of 2.7% per annum
Quintile groups distinguished by household disposable income between ages 20 and 67
Table reports statistics simulated with a DC pension, less statistics simulated without a pension asset
Simulations with a DC pension also apply a tax adjustment to ensure government budget neutrality
Tax adjustment applied as a fixed rate on all wage income, equal to 5.9%
* denotes % of population subgroup
** denotes % of median annual household disposable income between ages 20 and 67 in the simulation
     where a DC pension does not exist, equal to £52,548 in 2007 prices
income distribution. Less intuitive, however, is the observation that the reverse is true at
the beginning of the working life, when rates of pension participation are particularly high
among households in the bottom two income quintiles. This second observation is of note,
given that the NEST is explicitly designed for employees on low to modest incomes.
The relatively high rates of pension scheme participation that are observed early in life
among households in the bottom two income quintiles are attributable to the forward looking
nature of the decision framework. Households toward the top of the lifetime income distrib-
ution anticipate stronger wage growth early in the life course than those toward the bottom,
due to the specication that is assumed to govern the intertemporal development of human
capital (see Section E.). Furthermore, households toward the bottom of the lifetime income
distribution that expect weak wage growth, also anticipate to retire sooner households in
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the bottom quintile work for 38 years on average under the policy counterfactual without
pensions, which is 10 years less than households in the top quintile. These factors motivate
high income households to consume more early in life and delay their saving to later ages,
relative to households with lower wage expectations.
The statistics that are reported for employment in Table 3 indicate that labour supply
rises very marginally on average prior to pension age in response to the DC pension, but
falls substantially following pension age. These shifts reect two factors. First, and most
important, the DC pension encourages increased retirement saving, which allows households
to enter retirement on preferable terms from pension age. Second, it is driven by the timing
of the inuence of the DC pension and the compensating tax adjustments on the returns
to labour. Prior to pension age, the DC pension tends to raise the return to labour supply,
which is partly o¤-set by the coincident 5.9 percent xed tax rate applied to all wage income.
In contrast, only the e¤ect of the xed tax on wage income applies from pension age, which
tends to dampen the incentive to supply labour. The most pronounced e¤ects are observed
among households with the highest incomes, for whom the pension asset is most important.
The statistics reported for pension wealth and total net worth indicate that most pension
saving represents new saving in the model, rather than a transfer of saving from liquid assets.
This is particularly true for households in the lowest two lifetime income quintiles, for whom
the NEST is designed, but it also applies to households throughout the income distribution.
Unsurprisingly, the largest degree of o¤-setting is generated by the model for households at
the top of the income distribution and late in the working lifetime. But even among these
households, average o¤-setting between ages 50 and 67 does not exceed 30 percent, well
below the 40 percent average o¤-set currently projected for the NEST by the government.
There is extensive uncertainty in the empirical literature regarding the impact of pen-
sions on aggregate household saving, and theory provides little guidance about what we
should expect. One of the rst studies to consider the e¤ects of retirement pensions on
private saving is by Feldstein (1974), who used US macro-data to nd that social security
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depresses personal saving by 30-50 percent. During the 1980s a number of papers reported
econometric estimates based upon micro-data, which generally suggest that retirement pen-
sions have a small e¤ect on private saving (see, for example, King & Dicks-Mireaux (1982),
and Diamond & Hausman (1984)), with the implication that reserves built up under re-
tirement pensions generally represent an net addition to national wealth. More recently,
however, Gale (1998) and Attanasio & Rohwedder (2003) have reported much larger o¤sets
between 70 and 80 percent depending upon the focus of the analysis and the specication
adopted. Like the studies undertaken in the 1980s, these more recent papers are based upon
econometric estimates from micro-data, but they di¤er from the earlier studies in that the
specications considered for analysis are based upon inferences drawn from the life-cycle
model, adjusting for age and time e¤ects on the relationship between private saving and
pension wealth.
The inconclusive nature of the econometric evidence has been attributed to a number of
factors. These include lags in the adjustment of saving behaviour to policy reforms (see, for
example, Börsch-Supan & Brugiavini (2001) for discussion); heterogeneity of agent behav-
iour with regard to individual circumstances (eg. Gale (1998) and Attanasio & Rohwedder
(2003)); and the availability of suitable data (eg. Miles (1999)).
The low rates of pension o¤-setting that are reported here are attributable to disparities
between the policy environment assumed for estimating the model, and the policy counterfac-
tuals considered for analysis. The estimations assume a pension scheme that o¤ers generous
terms, relative to either saving in liquid wealth or the pension asset that is considered here.
Simulations based on the estimated model parameters and in the absence of any pension
asset consequently tend to result in small measures of household wealth, which limits the
extent to which saving in a pension can be o¤-set when this asset is included for analysis.
The results that are reported here highlight the need to take account of agent specic cir-
cumstances when considering how far pension saving is likely to substitute for other forms of
saving, particularly when the target population possesses modest nancial means as is the
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case for the NEST.
Welfare e¤ects in the form of compensating variations are reported at the bottom of
Table 3. These statistics indicate that the DC pensions tend to depress welfare at the
beginning of the simulated lifetime for households throughout the earnings distribution, with
the most pronounced e¤ects reported toward the top of the distribution. This is an intuitive
and important result: in context of the decision environment and time-consistent preference
structure that are assumed here, there is no welfare justication for the pension scheme.
In this case, the illiquidity of the DC pension reduces decision making exibility, and only
survives in context of voluntary participation to the extent that participants are subsidised
through tax advantages and matching employer contributions. In a closed nancial system
where the cost of any subsidy must be met without recourse to borrowing (as is the case
here), the DC pension will be regressive to the extent that it transfers resources from (poorer)
non-savers to (richer) savers. As such, the DC pension requires a consideration beyond the
scope of the current analysis to merit its introduction.
The welfare e¤ects of a DC pension become positive (negative compensating variations)
as age increases, reecting the increase in saving that is motivated by the DC pension
scheme. Furthermore, the prole of the welfare e¤ect is reasonably at through the income
distribution at age 20, which reects the uncertainty that is associated with how lifetime
prospects will evolve. This disparity widens with age, as the magnitude and inequality of
the distribution of wealth rises, as the period of illiquidity of pension wealth reduces, and as
lifetime uncertainty declines.
The nding that DC pensions depress welfare measured from the start of the simulated
lifetime is in direct contrast with Laibson et al. (1998), who report strictly positive welfare
gains to the introduction of a DC pension throughout the life course. The di¤erence between
the two studies in this respect is primarily attributable to di¤erences in the proportional
adjustments to employment income that are made to ensure budget balance, and indirectly
to the allowance for endogenous labour supply in the current analysis. The proportional
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tax on labour earnings that is required to maintain budget balance here is equal to 5.9
percent. This is almost twice the value of the matching employer contribution of 3 percent
that is received by the population subgroup who choose to participate in the DC pension.
As Laibson et al. (1998) adjust only for the matching employer pension contribution, they
apply a smaller proportional adjustment to wages relative to the current analysis, which is
su¢ cient to result in a net welfare surplus to employees.
Although some of the di¤erence between the rates of the matching employer pension
contribution and the tax adjustment that is required to maintain budget neutrality is ac-
counted for by the scal burden of tax incentives to pension saving, this is a relatively minor
consideration. Furthermore, the size of the proportional tax adjustment is not exaggerated
by behavioural responses to the tax adjustment. The wealth e¤ect of the proportional tax
on earnings is su¢ cient to increase rates of employment, relative to a counterfactual where
no proportional tax is applied (not reported). The principal reason that larger compensat-
ing adjustments are imposed in the current study, relative to Laibson et al. (1998), is the
reduction in labour supply that is generated in context of the DC pension from state pension
age. The earlier retirement ages simulated in context of the DC pension reduce tax receipts
levied on the foregone labour income, and increase the scal burden of welfare payments to
retirees, which are all o¤-set by the tax adjustment to wages.
C. Responses when preferences are myopic
The policy counterfactual that is considered here is identical to that of the preced-
ing subsection, with the exception that behavioural responses are generated assuming the
estimated model parameters that describe quasi-hyperbolic discounting reported in Table 1.
Comparing the top panel of Tables 3 and 4 reveals that the allowance made for myopia
tends to exaggerate rates of participation in the DC pension scheme, which increase by 2.5
percentage points on average between ages 20 and 49. The largest increases in participation
are generated for households in the third and fourth population quintiles between ages 35
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Table 4: Long-run e¤ects of introducing a dened contribution pension where a pension asset
did not previously exist and preferences are myopic
age group
lowest
income
quintile
2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile
highest
income
quintile
average
proportion of decile contributing to private pension (%*) proportion of decile contributing to private pension (%*)
20 to 34 35 23 14 11 13 19
35 to 49 64 54 51 61 77 61
50 to 67 38 38 60 79 86 60
change in employment (%*) change in employment (%*)
45 to 54 -0.1 0.1 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.5
55 to 64 -0.5 1.1 2.8 2.1 -0.3 1.0
65 to 74 -9.4 -10.3 -10.3 -18.0 -33.8 -16.4
average pension wealth (%**) average pension wealth (%**)
20 to 34 8 6 4 3 5 5
35 to 49 102 102 87 106 162 112
50 to 67 232 264 311 502 883 438
change in total net worth (%**) change in total net worth (%**)
20 to 34 8 5 4 3 5 5
35 to 49 102 101 87 108 163 112
50 to 67 231 260 287 436 748 393
compensating variation of pension introduction (%**) compensating variation of pension introduction (%**)
20 3 4 5 5 4 4
68 -51 -64 -92 -167 -349 -145
Responses to a DC pension paying a return to invested funds of 2.7% per annum
Quintile groups distinguished by household disposable income between ages 20 and 67
Table reports statistics simulated with a DC pension, less statistics simulated without a pension asset
Simulations with a DC pension also apply a tax adjustment to ensure government budget neutrality
Tax adjustment applied as a fixed rate on all wage income, equal to 5.6%
* denotes % of population subgroup
** denotes % of median annual household disposable income between ages 20 and 67 in the simulation
     where a DC pension does not exist, equal to £52,154 in 2007 prices
and 49, which possess both reasonably strong saving incentives, and additional capacity for
pension participation under time-consistent preferences (reported in Table 3). That these
same households also tend to reduce their pension participation later in life if they have
myopic preferences, reect the fact that savings accrued early in life are most at risk of
premature consumption in context of present biassed preferences.
Employment prior to retirement (not reported in Tables 3 or 4) is not much a¤ected by
the allowance made for quasi-hyperbolic discounting; average rates of employment between
ages 20 and 55 (not reported) increase by 0.2 percent in response to the DC pension under
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and by 0.3 percent under exponential discounting. Hence the
alternative commitment mechanism considered by the model (labour supply in context of a
positive experience e¤ect on prospective wages) does not appear to inuence responses to the
34
DC pension in this case. The employment statistics that are reported in the Tables 3 and 4
indicate that employment participation between ages 45 and 64 increases by 0.75 percentage
points on average in response to the DC pensions when preferences are myopic, as compared
with 0.3 percentage points in context of time consistent preferences. After households gain
access to their pension wealth (age 68 in the analysis), however, employment rates fall
fairly sharply by 11 percentage points on average under the assumption of exponential
discounting, and by over 16 percentage points under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The
more pronounced reduction in employment from pension age that is generated under quasi-
hyperbolic discounting is consistent with the dampened saving incentives due to the time
inconsistency of myopic preferences, so that myopic individuals without access to an illiquid
pension nd that they are less well placed to a¤ord retirement later in life DC pensions
help to mitigate this e¤ect.
The statistics reported for pension wealth in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that savings in
pensions are brought forward when preferences are myopic. This is consistent with the rates
of pension participation that are discussed above, and highlights the relative importance of
the commitment mechanism provided by the pension asset early in the working lifetime.
The statistics for total net worth reveal that aggregate saving rises in response to a DC
pension by almost 10 percent more on average between ages 50 and 67 when preferences are
myopic, relative to the case of exponential discounting21. The distributional statistics that
are reported in the respective tables indicate that this excess savings response in context
of myopic preferences is spread reasonably evenly across all households when measured in
absolute (per capita) terms. Myopia consequently has a more pronounced inuence on the
saving responses of households on low to modest incomes when measured relative to a priori
savings, which is of note as it is this population subgroup for whom the NEST is designed.
The exaggerated savings responses of lower income households, relative to those on higher
incomes, is attributable to the weaker life-cycle savings motives of low income households
relative to those on higher incomes, which are more easily overwhelmed by the distortions
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of present biassed preferences.
Furthermore, the statistics for pension wealth and total net worth taken together reveal
that there is a reduced tendency for households to o¤-set pension saving against other liquid
assets when preferences are myopic. This is because the imperfect substitutability between
pension wealth and liquid wealth is exaggerated in context of myopic preferences by the
commitment mechanism o¤ered by the illiquidity of pension wealth.
Finally, welfare statistics are reported at the bottom of Tables 3 and 4. These indicate
that myopia tends to improve the welfare e¤ect of the DC pension scheme at the beginning of
the simulated lifetime among households throughout the income distribution. Nevertheless,
the inuence of myopia is insu¢ cient to imply that the DC scheme is welfare improving
at age 20: households in the bottom lifetime income quintile would still require a lump-
sum payment equivalent to 2.7 percent of median annual household disposable income at
age 20 in context of the DC pension to be as well o¤ as in the absence of the scheme, and
this payment increases to between 4 and 5 percent for households on higher lifetime incomes.
Furthermore, between ages 20 and 49, the welfare e¤ect of a DC pension switches from being
more preferable under myopic preferences, to more preferable under exponential preferences.
This bias toward younger ages under quasi-hyperbolic discounting reects the importance
of the commitment mechanism that is o¤ered by pensions, which diminishes with the time
horizon to pension receipt.
D. Sensitivity to extent of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
A more general appreciation of the implications of myopia for behavioural responses to
a DC pension is made possible by considering the sensitivity of responses over the short-run
excess discount factor, , and the rate of return to the pension asset rp. The current section
focuses upon the e¤ects of the pension asset on population average statistics, based upon
the alternative preference parameters that are reported in Table 2. All aspects of the policy
environment other than , rp, and the exponential discount factor , were held xed between
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Table 5: Savings responses to the introduction of a pension asset, by short-run excess discount
factor and the return to pension wealth
short-run excess discount 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
pension wealth between ages 35 and 49*
pension return 2.0 0.638 0.744 0.625 0.663 0.598 0.639 0.578
(% p.a.) 2.5 0.864 1.078 0.962 1.013 0.927 0.950 0.853
3.0 1.121 1.308 1.227 1.317 1.272 1.299 1.196
3.5 1.308 1.541 1.446 1.556 1.503 1.569 1.504
4.0 1.508 1.671 1.617 1.715 1.709 1.793 1.738
4.5 1.625 1.793 1.757 1.873 1.856 1.959 1.920
5.0 1.735 1.903 1.839 1.961 1.952 2.070 2.036
pension wealth between ages 50 and 67*
pension return 2.0 2.959 3.317 3.087 3.293 3.151 3.269 3.204
(% p.a.) 2.5 3.744 4.196 3.951 4.135 4.008 4.086 3.961
3.0 4.493 4.881 4.673 4.874 4.784 4.856 4.737
3.5 5.082 5.454 5.257 5.448 5.362 5.462 5.377
4.0 5.569 5.888 5.694 5.870 5.828 5.929 5.860
4.5 5.934 6.221 6.075 6.253 6.174 6.296 6.230
5.0 6.246 6.535 6.341 6.519 6.445 6.589 6.503
percentage of pension wealth off-set against liquid wealth between ages 50 and 67
pension return 2.0 7.63 9.78 11.05 14.93 17.86 21.38 23.80
(% p.a.) 2.5 6.07 8.08 9.16 12.83 14.88 18.20 20.52
3.0 5.29 7.11 7.95 11.22 12.88 15.78 17.65
3.5 4.80 6.49 7.27 10.15 11.58 14.15 15.74
4.0 4.52 6.17 6.85 9.57 10.75 12.91 14.34
4.5 4.38 5.94 6.52 9.03 10.08 12.01 13.28
5.0 4.23 5.75 6.31 8.71 9.67 11.35 12.50
Table reports saving responses to a DC pension, relative to a policy environment with no pension asset
* Wealth expressed as ratio of median annual household disposable income between ages 20 and 67, worth £52,043
the simulated policy counterfactuals.
Statistics that describe the e¤ects of the introduction of the pension asset on savings
behaviour are reported in Table 5. The top and middle panels of this table reveal a clear
positive relationship between the rate of return assumed for pension wealth and the scale
of pension wealth, for all seven of the alternative values considered for the short-run excess
discount factor . As the rate of return to pension wealth is increased from 2 to 5 percent
per annum, the average pension wealth increases by a factor of 3 between ages 35 and 49,
and by a factor of 2 between ages 50 and 67. This intuitive response is more than a passive
consequence of the higher investment income that is consequent on an increased rate of
return; high rates of return to pension wealth motivate increased involvement in pensions
early in the working lifetime. When  = 0:85, a rise in the rate of return to pension wealth
from 3 percent per annum (approximating the rate considered in Table 4) to 4 percent
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per annum (which approximates the target reduction in management costs for the NEST)
increases average pension wealth between ages 35 and 49 by approximately 30 percent (from
1.32 to 1.72 times average annual disposable income), and increases average rates of pension
scheme participation between ages 20 and 35 by 25 percent (from 22.5 to 28.3 percent, not
reported in the table).
The top panel of Table 5 suggests that the extent of myopia tends to have a less pro-
nounced inuence on pension saving early in the working lifetime than the rate of return to
pension wealth. Nevertheless, a close inspection of the statistics reported in the top panel of
the table does reveal some interesting variation to the policy parameters. When the return
to pension wealth is low, the top panel of Table 5 indicates that saving in pensions early in
the working lifetime tends to increase with the extent of behavioural myopia. As the rate of
return to pension wealth increases, however, this relationship between myopia and pension
saving is reversed.
As noted in the introduction, the illiquidity of a pension fund in context of myopic pref-
erences can be welfare improving to the extent that it represents a commitment mechanism
that favours current preferences over future preferences. Importantly, the potential for a
pension fund to be used in this way depends upon the nature of its illiquidity, and is inde-
pendent of the rate of return paid to pension savings. Hence, the observation that pension
savings early in the working lifetime tend to respond positively to the extent of myopia when
the return to pension wealth is low suggests that the DC pension does help to resolve the
intra-personal conict that arises in context of time-inconsistent preferences in favour of the
present self. The additional observation that pension savings tend to respond negatively to
the extent of myopia when the return to pension wealth is high then indicates that the para-
metrisation of myopia is relatively inelastic to the return on pension wealth. Put another
way, relative to time-consistent exponential discounting, the myopic agents represented by
the model favour the illiquidity of the DC pension for the commitment mechanism that it
represents. But at the same time, the present bias of their preferences makes them less
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inclined to respond positively to an increase the return paid to pension wealth.
The middle panel of Table 5 indicates that average pension wealth between ages 50
and 67 tends to fall at a fairly stable rate as  is reduced below 1.0, for all ve rates of
return to pension wealth reported in the table. This is consistent with the present bias in
consumption that is associated with a lower , and with the declining role of the pension
asset as a commitment mechanism as the pension age draws near.
Discussion in Section C. suggests that myopia tends to dampen the extent to which
pension saving is o¤-set against saving in other forms. This impression is reinforced by the
statistics reported in the bottom panel of Table 5, which indicate that the o¤-set of pension
saving late in the working lifetime falls monotonically with both the extent of myopia and
the return to pension wealth, with myopia having the most pronounced inuence over the
range of policy parameters reported in the table. As noted in Section C., the scope for
myopic households to o¤-set pension saving is limited by the small balances of liquid wealth
that such households accrue in the absence of a pension asset, and by the desire to maintain
precautionary balances. The rst of these considerations becomes more acute as the extent of
myopia increases, which is the driving factor behind the fall in the pension o¤-set generated
at lower values of .
The reported decline of the savings o¤-set to the pension asset as the return to pension
wealth rises is attributable to four factors. First, high returns to the pension asset motivate
stronger pension participation early in life (as discussed above) when liquid savings are
relatively thin. Second, the wealth e¤ect associated with a rise in the return to pension wealth
motivates higher consumption during the working lifetime. Third, the higher consumption
during the working lifetime motivates larger precautionary balances to insure against an
adverse shock. And fourth, the measures of average pension wealth increase with the return
to the pension asset, so that the o¤-set actually increases in absolute terms.
An important conclusion of the discussion reported in Section B. is that the DC pension
is associated with a net welfare loss equivalent to 15 percent of average annual household
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disposable income at the beginning of the simulated lifetime. Although this loss is reduced to
4 percent under the myopic specication considered in Section C., it is nevertheless reported
for households throughout the earnings distribution. Table 6 reports how these welfare e¤ects
vary by the interest rate on pension wealth and the degree of myopia. The table indicates
that the average e¤ect of the DC pension on the welfare of households at age 20 improves
with both the return to the pension asset, and with the extent of behavioural myopia. The
former of these responses is of little surprise, but the latter indicates that the structure of the
pension asset does help to mitigate the welfare costs associated with the time-inconsistency
of a myopic preference structure as is posited above. Hence, myopia provides a plausible
justication for the DC pension considered here, consistent with one of the justications
raised for the introduction of the NEST. Indeed, if the NEST achieves its target economies
on management costs, then the analysis that is reported here suggests that the scheme may
be welfare improving ( = 0:85; and pension return of 3.5-4.0 % p.a.).
Table 6 reveals that the welfare e¤ect of a rise in the return to the pension asset trails o¤
at higher rates of return. This is due to the diminishing marginal utility of consumption, and
because, at high interest rates, the wealth e¤ect dominates leading to a fall in pension scheme
participation. The largest di¤erences for the welfare e¤ects of the DC pension between
alternative specications for myopia are observed when the return to the pension asset is
low. The 7 percent rate of return to pension wealth is included in the table to consider
the welfare response in the region of the apparent asymptote for the reported preference
specications. At this rate of return, there remains only a very slight improvement in the
welfare e¤ect of the DC pension as the extent of myopia is increased. This is explained
by the observation that decisions over pension involvement particularly early in life are
strongly inuenced by myopia at low rates of pension return, but are largely independent of
myopia when the return to the pension asset is very high.
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Table 6: Average compensating variations at age 20 to the introduction of a pension asset, by
short-run excess discount factor and the return to pension wealth (negative values indicate
positive e¤ects)
short-run excess discount 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
pension return 2.0 -2.08 0.28 4.89 6.85 10.18 13.69 15.48
(% p.a.) 2.5 -2.88 -2.34 1.37 6.12 9.01 13.13 14.28
3.0 -3.10 -2.96 -1.20 2.76 6.92 11.28 13.18
3.5 -3.19 -3.12 -2.83 -1.81 2.50 7.27 10.54
4.0 -3.19 -3.15 -3.07 -2.91 -1.59 2.36 6.34
4.5 -3.19 -3.15 -3.13 -3.07 -2.85 -1.92 1.74
5.0 -3.19 -3.15 -3.14 -3.12 -3.05 -2.89 -2.17
7.0 -3.19 -3.15 -3.14 -3.12 -3.11 -3.09 -3.06
Table reports Compensating Variations at age 20 under a DC pension, relative to a policy environment w ith no pension asset
Compensating Variations reported as % of median annual household disposable income betw een ages 20 and 67, w orth £52,535
V. Conclusions
This study explores how myopic preferences inuence behavioural and welfare responses
to a DC pension scheme in a realistic policy context that reects the income and demographic
uncertainties that households face. The analysis is structured around the National Employ-
ment Savings Trust that will be introduced in the UK in 2012, and the parameters of the
structural model used to conduct the analysis were estimated on survey data for a broad
subgroup of the UK population. Particular attention is paid to the inuence on the analysis
of allowing for joint decisions of labour supply and saving, which are crucial to understanding
retirement behaviour.
The parameter estimates that are reported for the structural model support the hypoth-
esis of quasi-hyperbolic discounting, indicating an estimate of the excess short-run discount
factor equal to 0.845 with a standard deviation of 0.040. The allowance for myopia is identi-
ed as improving the models match to survey data regarding pension scheme participation
and labour supply, consistent with the potential role of these factors in providing commit-
ment mechanisms within the model. The estimate for the excess short-run discount factor
exceeds those reported in previous studies (implying less pronounced myopia), which may
be due to the relatively broad population subgroup upon which the current econometric
analysis is based.
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The introduction of a DC pension scheme is found to encourage deferment of consump-
tion to later periods in life in all of the policy counterfactuals that are reported here. Myopic
preferences are found to exaggerate this response, increasing average total net worth between
ages 50 and 67 by between 6 and 22 percent depending upon the household income quintile,
when measured under the central policy scenario. Associated sensitivity analysis, however,
indicates that the impact of myopia on aggregate savings depends upon the return to pension
wealth. At low rates of return to pension wealth, myopia tends to increase savings held in
the pension asset, but at high rates of return myopia tends to reduce saving in the pension
asset. These results reect the role of the pension scheme as a commitment mechanism,
relative to its role as an e¢ cient vehicle for saving.
Labour supply is increased very slightly prior to pension age by the DC pension scheme
throughout the analysis, but falls substantially after households gain access to their pension
wealth. Labour supply falls by an average of 11 percentage points between ages 65 and 74
under the central policy scenario and on the assumption of exponential discounting, and by
16 percentage points under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The fall in labour supply from
pension age has an important bearing upon the compensating adjustments that are applied
in the analysis to o¤-set the e¤ect that the DC pension has on the average returns to labour
supply. Under the central policy scenario, this results in the nding that introduction of the
DC pension would reduce welfare at the beginning of the life, by an average amount worth
15 percent of average annual disposable income under exponential discounting, and by 4
percent of average annual disposable income under quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Notably,
however, the welfare e¤ect of the DC pension at the beginning of life is found to respond
positively to the rate of return to the pension asset, and to the disparity between the short-
run and long-run discount rates. In the region of the unrestricted parameter estimates for
the structural model, the analysis suggests that the DC pension would improve welfare if the
NESTs target of reducing annual management charges by 1 percent of capital is achieved.
The current analysis is limited to considering the implications for responses to a DC pen-
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sion of sophisticated myopia, so that agents are assumed to be fully aware of their propensity
to over-consume. However, it is quite likely that at least some people are naïvely unaware of
their myopia, which would negate the welfare benets of the commitment mechanism o¤ered
by pension fund illiquidity. Furthermore, even if the idea that some people are naïvely myopic
is rejected, accommodating such behaviour could facilitate a more nuanced interpretation of
the results that are reported here.
More substantively, an important aspect of the design of the NEST is the allowance that
is made for behavioural inertia through the adoption of an auto-enrolment mechanism. This
aspect of the scheme reects extensive empirical evidence that default options for pensions
regarding the decision to participate, rates of contributions, and investment strategies 
tend to have an important bearing on outcomes in practice (see, for example, Madrian &
Shea (2001)). It would consequently be of interest to extend the current analysis to allow
for decision making inertia: this is an issue that remains for further research.
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1On contemporary pension arrangements in OECD countries, see OECD (2009).
2See Cremer et al. (2007) and Fehr & Kindermann (2009) for studies that take account
of savings and labour supply decisions when exploring the implications of myopia for the
design of social security. Neither paper, however, focuses upon the implications for DC
pension schemes that are the focus here.
3Fagan (2003), for example, reports that approximately 1 in 5 employed people in Europe
work full-time when they would prefer to work part-time. The reasons most commonly given
for the mis-match include the perception that it would not be possible to do a desired job
part-time, that part-time employment is not o¤ered by a desired employer, and that it would
damage career prospects.
4EET taxation of pension savings, Exempts pension contributions, Expempts pension
investment returns, and Taxes pension fund dispersals.
5When a household transitions from being comprised of a couple at age t to a single adult
at age t + 1, then it is assumed to be the result of divorce if t + 1 < tSPA, and of death
otherwise.
6Dening wage potential at the household level rather than at the level of the individual
signicantly simplies the analytical problem by omitting the need to take account of a
range of issues including the sex of employees, imperfect correlation of temporal innovations
experienced by spouses, and so on.
7In context of time-inconsistent preferences, the solution consequently takes the form of
a Stackelberg equilibrium, where younger selves have a rst-mover advantage. Solution by
backward induction is made possible by the assumption that future selves cannot commit to
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strategies that react to the decisions of past selves.
8See, for example, Gourinchas & Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003), French (2005), Chatterjee
et al. (2007), Nardi et al. (2009).
9These include employees of the armed forces, national government, local government
services, justice, police, re, and social security departments.
10Calculated on 2007/08 FRS data, which indicates 12 percent of all workers self employed,
and 7.6 percent employed in public sector (SIC code 75).
11Public sector employees omitted from analysis were identied under Standard Industrial
Classication codes 9100-9199 (1980) / 75 (1992).
12The International Labour Organization (ILO) denition of labour market status was used
for the estimations. Age invariant statistics were applied after observing little systematic
variation by age.
13The sample selection model controlled only for the incidence of non-employment. House-
holds with adults who were less than full-time employed had their aggregate wage adjusted
up on the basis of the respective statistics discussed in Section C..5.
14Estimates were also obtained for two recursive substitutions (a dependent variable of
ln (gi;t+3)  ln (gi;t)), which were found to be qualitatively the same as those reported here.
15Full maximum likelihood estimation was undertaken using the heckmancommand in
STATA 10, adjusting for enumeration weights, and allowing for clustering by enumerated
individual in the error terms.
16The benets adopted for analysis applied a discount relative to the following: a state
pension of £ 135 per week per adult in current earnings terms, a means tested benet subject
to a claw back rate of 40% that is worth up to £ 35.29 per week for singles and £ 46.54 per
week for couples. The upper bounds of means tested benets were obtained by adjusting
the maximum value of the savings credit payable in 2006 by a real growth rate of 1% per
annum for 17 years (between 2008 and 2015).
17This resulted in an annuity rate of 6.06% for estimation. The 4.7% capital charge is
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based on typicalpricing margins reported in the pension buy-outs market in the UK. See
Lane et al. (2008), p. 22.
18The assumed preference relation implies that the sign of the partial derivative of utility
with respect to both consumption and leisure is given by (1="  ), so that it is positive
based on the point estimates reported here.
19In the case of the utility price of leisure, the parameter value was set to the average
between the point estimates obtained for the exponential and quasi-hyperbolic models, im-
posing the additional restrictions  = 1:4 and " = 0:55. These supplementary regression
statistics are available from the author upon request.
20Note that each simulated household is subject to the same age specic innovations be-
tween alternative policy simulations.
21An increase of 42% of average lifetime earnings over and above the 350% increase ob-
served for exponential discounting.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A First Stage Parameter Estimates
Table 7: Pension parameters and credit constraints distinguished by estimation scenario
singles couples
maximum credit £2,000 £2,000
all debts repaid by age 65 65
state pension age* 68 68
value of flat-rate state pension (£2006 per week) 121.50 243.00
means tested retirement benefits**
  maximum value (£2006 per week) 31.76 41.89
  withdrawal rate of benefits on private income 40% 40%
terms of private pensions
  employee contribution rate (% of earnings) 8 8
  employer contribution rate (% of earnings) 11 11
  min earnings threshold for eligibility (% median) 75 75
Source: Terms of state retirement benefits based on Pensions White Paper, DWP (2006b)
Notes: * See DWP (2006b), paragraph 3.34
** paid on top of flat-rate state pension
no standard errors obtained
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Table 8: Exogenously estimated model parameters various characteristics
real interest & growth rates (% p.a.)
credit fixed rate return to tax
cards deposits capital threshold
average 15.28 13.92 2.73 4.05 1.27 -0.08 0.33
std deviation 3.15 1.31 1.21 0.79 0.97 1.73 0.84
minimum 12.08 11.52 1.25 2.59 -0.31 -3.79 -0.79
maximum 19.81 15.34 4.66 5.29 2.75 4.40 1.43
sample period '96-'08 '96-'08 '96-'08 '88-'06 '90-'07 '78-'08 '97-'07
household demographics
logit regression for proportion of households single at age 20* 0.45
singles / couples all households single from age* 100
variable coefficient std. error non-linear regressions for number of children
constant -6.40607 0.34372 singles couples distribution of wages at age 20^
age 0.17634 0.02226 variable coefficient std. error coefficient std. error
age^2 -3.76E-03 4.47E-04 param0 0.67268 0.00041 1.54100 0.00053
age^3 2.66E-05 2.79E-06 param1 -0.00776 0.00001 -0.00711 0.00001
single 6.89326 0.03963 param2 38.2792 0.0056 39.7949 0.0037
sample 97619 sample 13527 10438 wage dynamics for households changing marrital status*
R squared 0.7947 R squared 0.203 0.5258
mortality probabilities from age 40*
age probability age probability age probability age probability
40 0.0001 60 0.0006 80 0.0105 100 0.2964
41 0.0000 61 0.0005 81 0.0116 101 0.3607
42 0.0000 62 0.0007 82 0.0129 102 0.4278
43 0.0001 63 0.0012 83 0.0167 103 0.4951
44 0.0000 64 0.0011 84 0.0176 104 0.5607
45 0.0001 65 0.0014 85 0.0225 105 0.6230
46 0.0001 66 0.0016 86 0.0243 106 0.6810
47 0.0000 67 0.0012 87 0.0262 107 0.7341
48 0.0001 68 0.0023 88 0.0310 108 0.7818
49 0.0002 69 0.0021 89 0.0408 109 0.8237
50 0.0002 70 0.0020 90 0.0503 110 0.8598
51 0.0001 71 0.0025 91 0.0548 111 0.8904
52 0.0002 72 0.0033 92 0.0610 112 0.9157
53 0.0003 73 0.0036 93 0.0632 113 0.9363
54 0.0002 74 0.0051 94 0.0834 114 0.9527
55 0.0003 75 0.0045 95 0.0935 115 0.9654
56 0.0004 76 0.0049 96 0.1139 116 0.9752
57 0.0003 77 0.0068 97 0.1449 117 0.9826
58 0.0005 78 0.0085 98 0.1865 118 0.9879
59 0.0008 79 0.0095 99 0.2375 119 0.9918
Notes: model parameters in bold
* no standard errors obtained
benefits growth rate estimated on historical rates for unemployment benefits and the basic state pension
relationship status modelled as a logit regression, describing the risk of being single as a function
of age, and whether single in preceding year
number of children by age described by the density function of the normal distribution - see equation (16)
mortality probabilities calculated on cohort life expectancies for couples where both members
aged 35 in 2007.
Source: credit card interest, Bank of England IUMCCTL; overdraft interest, Bank of England IUMODTL
fixed deposit interest, Bank of England, IUMWTFA; wages growth, Office National Statistics, LNMQ
return to capital derived from Khoman and Weale (2008), based on National Accounts data income flows
historical data on value of unemployment benefits, basic state pension, and tax thresholds obtained
from the Institute for Fiscal Studies
logit for relationship status estimated on weighted pooled data from waves 1 to 17 of the BHPS
equation for the number of children by age estimated on weighted data from the 2007/08 FRS
mortality rates based on historical survival rates to 2006 and ONS principal projections thereafter.
overdrafts wages benefits
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Table 9: Exogenously estimated model parameters earnings process
probability of low wage offer^
mean std dev sample
singles 0.29382 0.45551 3939
couples 0.06523 0.24694 3531
weekly wages and working hours by relationship and employment status^
relationship status couple couple couple couple single single
adults full-time emp 2 1 1 0 1 0
adults part-time emp 0 1 0 1 0 1
working hours
   mean 85.10 67.09 44.73 19.03 42.40 20.07
   std. deviation 12.54 13.08 10.49 8.55 8.50 9.28
log wages
   mean 6.822 6.612 6.175 4.841 5.924 4.707
   std. deviation 0.475 0.511 0.724 0.756 0.569 0.722
sample 2530 1814 1840 509 4352 1360
distribution of wages at age 20^
singles couples
coefficient std. error coefficient std. error
mean of (log) full-time wage, age 20 5.74605 0.00043 6.29821 0.00161
standard deviation of full-time wage, age 20 0.39571 . 0.10445 .
wage dynamics for households changing marrital status*
newly weds newly single
coefficient std. error coefficient std. error
target equation
constant 0.06442 0.06714 0.02537 0.08270
age -0.00797 0.00198 0.00016 0.00180
employment (single) / employment (couple)
   part time / 1 part time -0.14154 0.06627 -0.02215 0.12454
   part time / 1 full time 0.47775 0.29080 -1.55863 0.21295
   part time / 1 part time & 1 full time 1.44259 0.13195 -1.50337 0.06714
   part time / 2 full time 1.87653 0.19665 -1.65264 0.21921
   full time  / 1 part time -1.61412 0.42382 0.65706 0.04307
   full time  / 1 part time & 1 full time 0.29650 0.06387 -0.34763 0.04923
   full time  / 2 full time 0.64900 0.03275 -0.63573 0.03626
selection equation
   age 0.04772 0.02525 0.12171 0.02444
   age squared -0.00085 0.00032 -0.00156 0.00030
   degree -1.08084 0.12228 1.24433 0.11370
   other further education -1.07942 0.11253 1.15538 0.09038
   higher school qualification (A level) -1.07025 0.11781 1.10500 0.10204
   lower school qualification (O level) -1.12394 0.11623 1.01499 0.09083
   other education -1.61396 0.15082 0.82185 0.10304
   poor health -0.27916 0.11064 -0.30229 0.10154
   accident -0.17709 0.09139 0.45756 0.08773
   childcare -0.37326 0.09748 -0.27075 0.07306
   care (other) -0.10474 0.10116 0.00110 0.08468
   woman -0.80629 0.07546 1.51969 0.18730
   constant 0.68686 0.46202 -5.81684 0.50812
summary statistics
correlation 0.69441 0.07586 -0.09977 0.102915
standard error 0.40089 0.02385 0.36413 0.015331
Number of (weighted) observations 2742 2517
Censored observations 2163 2012
Uncensored observations 579 505
Log pseudolikelihood -1194.495 959.637
Wald test of independent equations
   Chi squared statistic 34.17 0.93
   p value 0.00 0.34
Notes: model parameters in bold
prob of low wage offer = proportion of households aged 25-45 with no adult employment
mean log income at age 20 estimated using sample selection model - reported in Appendix
std of log income at age 20 calculated from raw survey data, no std errors obtained
dependent variables in equations for wage dynamics = (ln(observed wage(t+1)) - ln(observed wage(t)))
Source: ^ author's calculations on data from 2007/08 wave of the FRS
* author's calculations on data from waves 1 to 17 of the BHPS
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Table 10: Estimated wage dynamics for households not changing marital status
singles couples
coefficient std. error coefficient std. error
target equation
   age* -0.0018 0.0001 -0.0012 0.0001
   experience effect
    1 full-time & 1 part-time emp . . -0.0101 .
    1 ful-time employed . . -0.0120 .
    1 part-time employed -0.0170 . -0.0144 .
    not employed -0.0350 . -0.0200 .
   constant 0.1047 0.0054 0.0777 0.0043
selection equation
   age* 0.0911 0.0072 0.1013 0.0061
   age squared* -0.0012 0.0001  -0.0012 0.0001
   highest education qualification
     no education qual recorded -0.1467 0.0889  -0.1303 0.0537
     lower school (O-level D-E) 0.0494 0.1266  -0.0055 0.0664
     mid school (O-level A-C) 0.1763 0.0726 0.0228 0.0445
     higher school (A-level) 0.1360 0.0809 0.0520 0.0561
   post-school qualification -0.0795 0.0646  -0.0748 0.0528
   poor health -0.6752 0.0701  -0.3693 0.0407
   accident -0.0173 0.0527  -0.0581 0.0295
   childcare -0.8101 0.0737  -0.2820 0.0369
   care (other) -0.0636 0.0675  -0.1411 0.0323
   woman -0.0709 0.0615 . .
   Standard Occupational Classification
     manager, admin, prof 1.9272 0.0783 0.7528 0.0509
     assoc prof, technical, clerical 1.4495 0.0727 0.6791 0.0481
     craft, personal protective 1.6056 0.0720 0.6975 0.0464
     sales, plant, machinery 1.6544 0.0793 0.7077 0.0497
   constant -3.9136 0.2534  -3.7755 0.2456
summary statistics
correlation* 0.0706 0.0336 0.1078 0.0312
standard error* 0.1153 0.0023 0.0928 0.0013
Number of (weighted) obs 12671 20682
Censored observations 6346 8385
Uncensored observations 6325 12297
Log pseudolikelihood -5471.04 -8021.352
Wald test of independent equations
   Chi squared statistic 4.38 11.75
   p value 0.0364 0.0006
Wald test of linear constraints
   Chi squared statistic 2.42 2.87
   p value 0.2979 0.5791
Source: Wage dynamics estimated on data from waves 1 to 17 of the BHPS
Notes: model parameters in bold
Estimates using a sample selection model with robust standard errors
Endogenous variable = (log emp inc in period (t+2) - log emp inc in period (t))
Experience effect calculated on observed labour market status in periods t and (t+1)
Wage dynamics equation based on dummy variables, except those denoted by *
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B Moments for Second Stage Estimation
Table 11: Moments considered for second stage estimation
estimate variance sample
males aged 50 to 59 not economically active: lowest wealth quintile / highest wealth quintile 2.2429 0.0650 379
proportion participating in employer sponsored pensions mean ln(consumption)
singles couples singles couples
age estimate variance sample estimate variance sample estimate variance sample estimate variance sample
25 0.1483 0.1263 262 0.4071 0.2414 78 5.2273 0.7022 61 6.1993 0.4252 16
26 0.1980 0.1588 287 0.4012 0.2402 95 5.2845 0.8906 58 5.9442 0.4234 21
27 0.1988 0.1593 224 0.4294 0.2450 135 5.2998 0.9692 61 6.1538 0.5407 35
28 0.2464 0.1857 192 0.4934 0.2500 147 5.5013 0.6704 62 6.1765 0.5091 43
29 0.3242 0.2191 195 0.5494 0.2476 105 5.3634 0.9119 58 6.3905 0.4750 45
30 0.2247 0.1742 178 0.5770 0.2441 146 5.6775 0.8520 44 6.2908 0.4693 46
31 0.3536 0.2286 163 0.5428 0.2482 127 5.6052 0.7938 42 6.3497 0.5038 49
32 0.2827 0.2028 156 0.5325 0.2489 156 5.5502 0.7894 38 6.5598 0.3619 49
33 0.3203 0.2177 161 0.5174 0.2497 162 5.5827 0.7678 44 6.4610 0.4157 43
34 0.3336 0.2223 171 0.6308 0.2329 174 5.8206 0.6098 25 6.3963 0.5789 54
35 0.2910 0.2063 180 0.5582 0.2466 191 5.7254 0.9171 51 6.3657 0.5303 58
36 0.2907 0.2062 196 0.6112 0.2376 201 5.5911 0.8021 50 6.5152 0.5086 67
37 0.2581 0.1915 171 0.5291 0.2492 230 5.4818 0.8427 34 6.5286 0.4897 57
38 0.2924 0.2069 193 0.5885 0.2422 206 5.7905 0.6925 48 6.5678 0.4835 61
39 0.2521 0.1886 163 0.5664 0.2456 234 5.6120 0.8574 51 6.6305 0.4655 50
40 0.3029 0.2112 170 0.5840 0.2429 205 5.7306 0.7470 44 6.6838 0.5741 58
41 0.2951 0.2080 178 0.6234 0.2348 214 5.7790 0.6744 48 6.5583 0.4752 77
42 0.3581 0.2299 215 0.5788 0.2438 252 5.9342 0.7383 52 6.5614 0.6287 59
43 0.3268 0.2200 210 0.6386 0.2308 220 5.8971 0.8861 48 6.4836 0.4362 51
44 0.3986 0.2397 171 0.6795 0.2178 171 5.7790 0.8138 54 6.6471 0.5647 61
45 0.3434 0.2255 185 0.6209 0.2354 207 5.5147 0.7423 48 6.6077 0.5090 69
proportion employed full-time proportion employed part-time
singles couples singles couples
age estimate variance sample estimate variance sample estimate variance sample estimate variance sample
25 0.6649 0.2228 262 0.7202 0.2015 78 0.1059 0.0947 262 0.1088 0.0969 78
26 0.6063 0.2387 287 0.7057 0.2077 95 0.1199 0.1055 287 0.1051 0.0941 95
27 0.6131 0.2372 224 0.7097 0.2060 135 0.1059 0.0947 224 0.1170 0.1033 135
28 0.6737 0.2198 192 0.7731 0.1754 147 0.0949 0.0859 192 0.0757 0.0700 147
29 0.6018 0.2396 195 0.7002 0.2099 105 0.1056 0.0944 195 0.1105 0.0983 105
30 0.6259 0.2341 178 0.7345 0.1950 146 0.0758 0.0700 178 0.1044 0.0935 146
31 0.6936 0.2125 163 0.7148 0.2039 127 0.0618 0.0580 163 0.1305 0.1134 127
32 0.6559 0.2257 156 0.7366 0.1940 156 0.0858 0.0784 156 0.0930 0.0844 156
33 0.6240 0.2346 161 0.6490 0.2278 162 0.0834 0.0765 161 0.1324 0.1149 162
34 0.6573 0.2253 171 0.7117 0.2052 174 0.0820 0.0753 171 0.1347 0.1165 174
35 0.6089 0.2381 180 0.6710 0.2208 191 0.0926 0.0840 180 0.1062 0.0949 191
36 0.5826 0.2432 196 0.6611 0.2240 201 0.1022 0.0918 196 0.1456 0.1244 201
37 0.5726 0.2447 171 0.6512 0.2271 230 0.1144 0.1013 171 0.1553 0.1312 230
38 0.5400 0.2484 193 0.6304 0.2330 206 0.1644 0.1374 193 0.1525 0.1292 206
39 0.4748 0.2494 163 0.6334 0.2322 234 0.1688 0.1403 163 0.1776 0.1461 234
40 0.5264 0.2493 170 0.6080 0.2383 205 0.1480 0.1261 170 0.1802 0.1477 205
41 0.5029 0.2500 178 0.6114 0.2376 214 0.1569 0.1323 178 0.1753 0.1445 214
42 0.5444 0.2480 215 0.6503 0.2274 252 0.1484 0.1264 215 0.1808 0.1481 252
43 0.5759 0.2442 210 0.6494 0.2277 220 0.1720 0.1424 210 0.1947 0.1568 220
44 0.5404 0.2484 171 0.6232 0.2348 171 0.1477 0.1259 171 0.1811 0.1483 171
45 0.5009 0.2500 185 0.6398 0.2304 207 0.1448 0.1239 185 0.1881 0.1527 207
Source: employment and pension statistics estimated on FRS data, 2007/08
all consumption moments estimated on 2007 EFS data, for households aged 25 to 45
economic activity by wealth quintile derived from Marmot, et al.  (2003, p. 156).
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